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Ralph Waldo Emerson in 1860 said, “We
learn geology the day after the earthquake.”
Traditionally, the world learns prevention the
day after the epidemic. Today, we have the
responsibility of preparing for the prevention and
control not only of known but also unknown
conditions. Eradication is a focused field exercise
in which approaches have been tested and from
which public health lessons can be learned.
Lessons from Eradication
Calculated Risks
It is clear, in retrospect, that we didn’t know
how to eradicate smallpox when the eradication
effort began. Thirty years ago, in the middle of
the smallpox campaign in West and Central
Africa (charged with ending transmission in 20
countries in 5 years), we tried a new strategy,
converting from mass vaccination to surveillance
and containment. Although we were 1 1/2 years into
the campaign when the strategy shift occurred, we
still reached the goal of zero cases on time and
under budget. The lesson is that we do not have the
luxury of waiting until we know everything before
doing something. We are always called upon to
make decisions with insufficient information and
make corrections midcourse.
Interdependence
Disease eradication campaigns illustrate the
value of working as global citizens rather than as
a collection of national programs. First promoted
by the Soviet Union in 1958, smallpox eradication
did not get the approval of the World Health
Assembly until 8 years later in 1966, when it
became a joint proposal of the Soviet Union and
the United States. If we could form this alliance
during the cold war, how many alliances can we
form now? No country alone can prevent or
control emerging infections.
Knowledge
We did not understand the limitations of
smallpox transmission; we knew nothing about
fetishes or the role of nomads. As organisms, the
environment, people, and tools change, programs
must change. Appropriate response requires
good epidemiologic analysis. The epidemiology,
in turn, can be no better than the facts assembled.
Knowledge is dependent on the information
system; in public health, the surveillance system
forms the foundation of knowledge.
Vision
With eradication, the vision is no more cases.
With emerging infections, the vision is rapid,
appropriate, effective response, being prepared
to protect the world because you are ready to act.
Performance
With eradication, to get global support, we
must demonstrate that a disease can be
eliminated from a geographic area. With
emerging infections, the value of surveillance (for
making decisions, for deciding on interventions)
must be demonstrated.
Humility
With all our experience, we have not gone
far on the road to eradicating disease. This
knowledge keeps us humble. We have trouble
outthinking a virus. Even smallpox humbled us
until the very end. That virus seemed to have a
better understanding of nature, human behav-
ior, and ways to achieve immortality than the
entire smallpox eradication team. The emer-
gence and reemergence of infections must be
approached with humility.
Enemies
Some anthropologists think conflict is not
only inevitable but needed. Will Durant once
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doubted the world could ever combine forces
without fear of an alien invasion. Perhaps disease
could be used as a surrogate enemy? Emerging
infections are a powerful common enemy well
suited as a global challenge.
Focused Energy
Energy focused on a specific end can also build
infrastructure. Energy focused on eradication
improved infrastructure. Surveillance, logistic
systems, evaluation, field teams, and cluster
sampling are concepts used during eradication that
are now part of primary health care.
Optimism
The pessimists and cynics were not just
wrong with smallpox; they were harmful. They
diverted attention, generated doubts in those
who could provide resources, invented problems
far beyond the vast array of existing ones. Even
though negative news can be of value, their
usefulness is limited. Large problems should be
approached with optimism.
Conclusions
Nine hundred years ago, building inventions
converged and reached a peak, leading builders and
architects of the time to try ever bolder structures.
Cathedrals were built that in turn led to new
innovations. For several hundred years Europe was
rewarded not only with cathedrals but also with
better building techniques for all structures. The
infrastructure changed. Historians, in a thousand
years, will look on the public health cathedrals that
resulted from better building materials in a period
of 75 years, from the mid-20th century until the
early 21st century. The control and eradication of
infectious diseases that once caused great
trepidation produced better diagnostic systems,
treatment, and vaccines, the elements with which
to strengthen and improve the public health system
and confront new disease challenges.